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The mineral sector is, prima facie, one in which there is
a clear mutuality of interests between the EEC and the
Third World. Europe relies heavily on imports for its
requirements of mineral raw materials; a large
proportion of those imports are from Africa, Asia and
Latin America (see Table 1). In turn, a number of
developing countries derive substantial proportions of
their export revenue from their mining industries (see
Table 2). Public sector cooperation could conceivably
help develop the mining industries of the producing
countries and increase their export revenue while
providing security of supplies and stable prices to the
consuming countries.
Current EEC Policy
This was the broad rationale behind the introduction
in the Second Lomé Convention of the special scheme
Table I
The European Community's sources of supplies of major non-fuel minerals and metals
1979-80 averages in percentages
for mineral products known as Minex or Sysmin.
More specifically, it reflected the concern amongst
EEC members about the potential reduction in
mineral supply from Africa because of lack of
investment.
An official of the EEC Commission has described the
objectives of the Community negotiators of the
'Minerals Product' chapter in the second ACP-EEC
Convention in the following terms:
The envisaged measures should be compatible with
the natural sovereignty of the ACP states over their
domestic natural resources; they should form a
package expressing a mutually beneficial inter-
dependence; . . . the security of the mining
investment would constitute only one of the
elements along with the maintenance of the
production and export capacities of existing mines,
(a) Weighted according to value of European consumption of each produce in its common form.
Source: derived from P. C. F. Crowson, Minerals Handbook 1982-83, Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1982.
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domestic
production
or recovery
developed
countries
Eastern
bloc (inc
China) AC?
other less
developed unallocated
Bauxite 40 27 31 1
Alumina 74 4 20 - 2
Aluminium 78 17 2 2 - 1
Copper 20 20 S 29 26
Iron Ore 13 42 16 27 2
Lead 56 28 1 - 9 6
Manganese 53 31 12 4
Nickel 13 50 13 13 10 1
Phosphates 24 2 16 51 7
Tin 7 5 2 8 73 5
Zinc 43 36 2 1 14 4
Weighted average
of above
products (a)
20 33 3 22 19 2
Table 2
Share of minerals in total merchandise exports 1980-81 and relevant ACP Sysmin dependence threshold
not available in IFS
Source: IMF international Financial Statistics, vol XXXV no 12, December 1982, except for Guinea and Zimbabwe
1979; figures from World Bank
2 figures from Zimbabwe Monthly Digest of Statistics
financial support for exploration and productive
investments, etc; increased involvement of public
authorities in mineral development in order to
create favourable conditions for the relaunching of
mining activities, while recognising that those
authorities could only act as a catalyst in
generating private European capital and should
not affect the traditional role of the mining
companies; on the basis of these principles, the
Lomé II Convention offers the means to safeguard
existing production and export capacities against
major disruptions beyond the control of the ACP
states concerned, relaunch research and exploration
efforts, and facilitate and stimulate investments in
identified projects. [Goldstein 1982:183]
Clearly, therefore, an important element in the
Community's overall objectives was to respond to the
demands of European mining companies, concerned
both with access to resources to expand their
involvement in ACP mining and, more particularly,
with measures to increase the security of mining
investment. While stopping short of accepting the
more radical demands of the companies such as
provisions for 'political risk' insurance and for
sanctions against host governments that unilaterally
alter the terms of mineral concession agreements, the
Convention introduced two new instruments specifi-
cally designed to stimulate private investment.
First, it offered a new possibility for agreements
relating to individual mining projects in the ACP
countries where the Community contributes towards
their financing. Such agreements, involving the
Community, a member state and an ACP state would
be designed to reconcile the concern of European
operators about the security of their investment and
43
Sysmin
dependence
ACP state threshold (%) product
export
dependence
by products (%)
1980 1981
Zambia lo Copper 91.3 94.8
Zaire 15 Copper 43.2 46.7
Cobalt 21.1 19.1
Papua New Guinea lo Copper 45.1 49.5
Jamaica 10 Bauxite and alumina 76.4 77.4
Surinam 10 Bauxite and alumina 68.6 69.1
Guyana 15 Bauxite and alumina 48.3 41.3
Guinea lo Bauxite and alumina 94.P .
Mauritania lo Iron ore 77.8 64.6
Liberia 15 Iron ore 52.7 62.4
Togo lo Phosphates 39.6 .
Senegal 15 Phosphates 16.3
Mineral exports near but below threshold
Rwanda lo Tin 8.0
Gabon 15 Manganese 7.1 6.5
Mineral exports above threshold but product excluded
Niger Uranium 76.3
Botswana Copper Nickel matte 20.5 24.3
Zimbabwe Nickel and all ferrous products 23.52 19.52
operating conditions with the legitimate rights of the
host country government. They would cover such
matters as the financing of the project and its related
infrastructure, distribution of the product, training
obligations of the operator, guarantees that the terms
of the agreement would only be altered in accordance
with pre-agreed renegotiation clauses, and procedures
for dealing with the settlement of difficulties, disputes
and with the determination of compensation in the
event of nationalisation. As an inducement to enter
into such agreements, and as an additional contri-
bution to the stabilisation of relations between
partners in mining projects, the Convention also holds
out the prospect of Community assistance in the
financing of host country participation in the
shareholding of mining enterprises developing the
resources of ACP countries [EEC-ACP 1981, Title III,
ch 2, article 58].
As a catalyst to stimulate private sector investment in
mining, 200 mn European Units of Account (EUAs)
have been made available to the European Investment
Bank (EIB) to enable it to participate in mining and
energy projects of mutual interest to the Community
and ACP countries, and the restriction previously
placed on EIB interest rebates in the hard-rock mining
sector has been lifted [EEC 1979].
In addition, available resources to assist exploration
and prospecting, and tle development o lerso'lecXge
about a specific deposit have been 'increased and
diversified'. If the ACP states concerned decide to
accord such projects the necessary development
priority, they can call on loans or grants from the
European Development Fund (EDF) to provide
technical and financial assistance to strengthen the
capacity of geological and mining divisions within
ACP governments, and even to establish national or
regional exploration funds (EEC-ACP 1981, Title III,
ch 2, article 58). Separate from this provision, the
amount of 'risk capital' available for the launching of
mining projects has been increased from 95 mn EUAs
in Lomé I to 280 mn EUAs in Lomé II, and the
purposes for which such 'risk capital' can be used have
been broadened to include a range of pre-production
expenditures [EEC-ACP 1981, article 51].
The Sysmin scheme
But the main innovation in Lomé II with regard to
minerals is the introduction of the Sysmin scheme, the
stated aim of which is to contribute to the creation of a
more solid basis for the development of ACP states
largely dependent on their mining sectors. It is not, as
Stabex is, a mechanism for automatic compensation
of export losses, but it nevertheless provides a kind of
limited insurance formula by helping to maintain
production and export capacity when either is
adversely affected by 'serious, temporary disruption
beyond the control of the ACP states concerned'
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[EEC-ACP 1981, article 49]. Declines in the capacity
to produce or export can be classed under three heads:
political (including involuntary political disruptions
originating in neighbouring states); technical (includ-
ing unforeseen physical difficulties at the mine such as
floods and fire); or managerial (eg the unexpected
departure of large numbers of qualified staff or some
other forms of withdrawal of labour). But an
application for funds may also be made to counter
economic factors like abnormal reductions in prices or
quantities exported which could adversely affect
maintenance of plant. Sysmin is not intended,
however, to subsidise mining operations which are not
economically viable in the long term.
Eligibility for Sysmin coverage is limited to ACP states
and, since the scheme operates on a product-by-
product basis, to those ACP countries which derive at
least 15 per cent of their merchandise export earnings
(10 per cent for the least developed, island and
landlocked category) from the product. This is the
so-called 'dependence threshold'. The seven minerals
included in the scheme are copper - including
associated cobalt production - phosphates, man-
ganese, bauxite and alumina, and tin. Iron ore was
already included in Stabex, and will continue there for
the duration of Stabex II as regards production and
export fluctuations from deposits already worked;
new mines however already fall under Sysmin.
Minerals are thus covered only when exported in their
raw state, ie up to the state of wirebars or ingots or the
corresponding level for phosphates.
The scheme comes into effect in cases where there has
been 'a substantial fall' in the production or export-
earning capacity of a qualifying product that could
'seriously affect the development policy of the ACP
state concerned by seriously compromising the
profitability of an otherwise viable and economic line
of production, thus preventing it from renewing at a
normal rate or maintaining the production plant or
export capacity'. An insertion made later in the
Convention states that the 'substantial fall' shall be
taken to mean 10 per cent (EEC-ACP 1981, article 52).
Unlike Stabex, where the 'dependence threshold'
relates to the previous year, for Sysmin the export
dependence qualification relates 'as a general rule' to
the earnings profile over the previous four years.
The amount budgeted for expenditure under the
scheme is 280 mn EUAs, with an additional 2mn
added when Zimbabwe became an ACP state, to be
disbursed in five approximately equal annual tranches
of some 56 mn EUAs.' However, up to 50 per cent
extra may be used from the allocation of the following
year if the governments of EEC member states
'The standard average annual exchange rate between the EUA and the
US$ has moved as follows: 1981 :1 EUA = $1. 116
1 EVA = $0.98
authorise it; also, any balance remaining at the end of
each year is carried over automatically to the next. No
country may receive more than half the aid provided in
any one year. Resources provided under the Sysmin
scheme are, unlike Stabex, only available as loans with
fixed repayment conditions. These are in normal
cases: 40 year maturity, 1 per cent annual interest
charged, but a 10-year grace period for repayment of
principal. Sysmin resources are, however, financed
from exactly the same source as Stabex and EEC
project aid in ACP countries, ie from the EDF, itself
funded by direct contributions from the member states
of the EEC. Again, unlike Stabex, Sysmin loan finance
is available only for projects and programmes whose
implementing conditions are identical to the EDF aid
supplied to ACP states under their indicative aid
programmes: the Sysmin chapter in the Convention
refers to Title VII (basically EDF aid project
procedure) for all matters requiring explanation.
However, under Sysmin the need for rapid imple-
mentation is specifically recognised.
Applications for advances need to be based on
estimates of falling production capacity expected over
subsequent months. Moreover, the amount of aid
made available is not necessarily related to the
anticipated export earnings shortfall. Rather, the
amount of aid is determined by the EEC Commission
(not the applicant) 'in the light of the funds available,
the nature of the projects or programmes proposed by
the ACP states concerned and the possibilities of co-
financing' [EEC-ACP 1981, Title III, ch 2, article 54}.
The money must normally be spent on supplies or the
provision of services 'as a means of pre-financing
projects and programmes'. Thus discretion remains
substantially with the donor. The Commission alone
decides upon the acceptability of the proposal and the
amount of the loan. Only when the earmarked
resources are converted into a project does the
Commission require the approval (or rather the
absence of an objection) from the EDF Committee, on
which are represented the 10 member states.
Experience so far
An examination of the operation of the scheme so far
reveals several problems. To begin with, the
enumeration of products above is somewhat mis-
leading. At the moment, there are no ACP countries
that derive 15 per cent of their export revenue from
either manganese or tin; the scheme applies, therefore,
only to the other three products and is, in fact,
overwhelmingly dominated by copper. So, the main
beneficiaries of a scheme drawing on aid funds are
comparatively better-off producers of copper (Papua
New Guinea, Zambia and Zaire), and therefore its
developmental impact on the poorer countries may be
limited. On the other hand, the impact of the scheme in
terms of the interests of the EEC countries is restricted
by the funds available. In the recent past, two loans
under the scheme have been agreed: one to Zaire for
40 mn EUAs (some $56 mn) and another one to
Zambia for 55 mn EUAs (some $77 mn). In both
cases, applications had been made for 140 mn EUAs
over five years; that is some $195 mn and half of the
total budget under the scheme. The requirements of
investment in the copper industry in Zaire for 1983 are
estimated at $250 mn; this would allow immediate
rehabilitation of old and obsolete equipment and
plant and expansion of productive capacity to rècover
to the 1974 high of 470,000 tons of copper (current
production is about 425,0000 tons). The longer term
requirement is estimated at $1.1 bn [EIU 1982:12]. In
the case of Zambia, investment requirements are
estimated at $1.15 bn for the five years of Lomé II
[Fortin 1981:197].
The Zambian Sysmin drawing was fixed from the start
by the Commission at 55 mn EUAs. Both Zambia's
production and balance of payments difficulties (in
the sense that the Zambian economy's dependence on
copper exports was recognised as overwhelming) were
taken into account in fixing the figure close to the
maximum possible for a single ACP state in the
circumstances (50 per cent of the accumulated
tranches for the first two years). The drawing thus
bears only a remote or accidental relation to the size of
the real shortfall in the production and export sector.
Zaire's allocation of 40 mn EUAs is smaller because
the Commission considered Zaire's dependence on
copper to be less crucial (it was deemed to be mitigated
by the less adversely affected cobalt exports as well as
agricultural products and diamonds); the Commission
also considered that the technical conditions of mining
were easier than in Zambia and that the ores were
generally of higher grade. Apparently, all these factors
influence the Commission's determination of the right
to a transfer and of the scale of the transfer. Moreover,
unlike the Zambian case, for Zaire the Commission
attached conditions to the Sys min loan which bind the
government to a new fiscal regime for the copper
sector and consequently required a reorganisation of
financial relations between the Kinshasa Government
and the (albeit state-owned) mining company,
Gécamines. These conditions were ultimately accepted
because the World Bank (specifically in the mining
sector and elsewhere) and the IMF were simultaneously
proposing fiscal and macroeconomic adjustments as
part of, respectively, a $500 mn Gécamines rehabili-
tation and a major IMF standby agreement. The EEC
Commission's conditionality fitted well into these
proposals, although the scale of the contribution
(40 mn EUAs as a loan) was of course rather small in
comparison. As a result of these conditions, which in
the case of Sysmin were a prerequisite for the loan
application to go ahead, the government agreed in
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September 1981 to introduce new fiscal laws. No
export duties were to be imposed on copper;
corporation tax was to be applied only on Gécamines'
profits (operating surpluses) until 1983; and more
general fiscal reforms were to be introduced gradually
under the guidance of the IMF. Both the Zaire
Government and the EEC were considering possi-
bilities of direct marketing of output by Gécamines as
part of the Sysmin package.
Two new applications - Rwanda for tin and Guyana
for white bauxite - both for 1981 downturns, were
still in the very early stages of processing in mid-1982.
Preliminary reports suggested that the Guyana
operation would proceed, as nearly all the bauxite was
exported to the EEC, but the Rwanda case was more
problematic as mine exhaustion was the key factor in
the downturn of production.
In the case of both Zambia and Zaire, it will be noted,
the aid under Sysmin represents only a fraction of the
capital requirements. It is, furthermore, solely for the
rehabilitation of existing capacity or some expansion
of treatment capacity; the financing of exploration
- itself a highly cost-effective use of aid - is not
contemplated. There may be no formal obstacle to the
inclusion of exploration projects within Sysmin but
the fact that it is linked to serious disruptions in
production, exports, or export earnings tends to bias it
in favour of non-exploration uses. As indicated above,
a separate chapter in the Convention refers to
technical and financial assistance for research and
exploration, but no specific scheme is included. As
also indicated, another form of support for mining
activities in the Convention is contained in Article 59,
which states that the EIB can finance mining and
energy investment projects in accordance with its
general rules of operation. Zambia has in fact been
able to secure partial EIB support for an expansion of
treatment capacity in the form of a new leaching plant.
The overall cost is $250 mn, of which EIB provides
$26 mn. The EIB facility has also been used by Papua
New Guinea for the 0k Tedi project. Use of the facility
in that case was not necessary in order to render the
project viable. It was simply looked upon as a way of
gaining access to concessional risk capital.
It is easy - perhaps too easy - to be critical of the
limited impact achieved by the measures designed to
promote cooperation in the mineral-producing sector
during Lomé II. There is a sense in which the effects of
the continuing recession have overwhelmed small,
partial programmes of this kind. That the facilities
introduced were intended to promote European
interests as consumers as well as to assist ACP
producers is not in dispute, nor that the ACP countries
eligible to benefit are likely to be few. The Commission
itself may also need a little time to formulate
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procedures for the operation of such new facilities,
and the ACP countries time to become familiar with
them. There is a sense, therefore, in which more time
- and more normal times - may be required before
the facilities can be judged fairly.
Proposals for New Initiatives
In that context, it may be thought premature to ask
whether there may be other initiatives in the mineral
sector that could be of mutual benefit to the EEC and
the ACP countries. In any case, the truthful answer to
that question is that we do not know; for, while it is
possible to conceive schemes that would appear to
have a good probability of being mutually beneficial,
it is not certain that the precise measures that would be
required to give practical expression to these concepts
can be designed and successfully negotiated.
Nevertheless, there are three types of activity which
can be mentioned as areas of potential mutual
advantage where new initiatives might be considered.
These are: the promotion of exploration; emergency
purchases of minerals from selected ACP countries
when prices are exceptionally low; and the encourage-
ment of mineral revenue stabilisation funds.
Exploration
It has frequently been asserted that, mainly because of
their assessment of the 'political risk' involved,
investment in exploration by the major European
mining companies in developing countries, particularly
the ACP countries, has declined sharply. The statistics
most often quoted in support of this contention
purport to show that, whereas in 1961 exploration in
such countries absorbed 57 per cent of the total
exploration budget, by 1973-75 the comparable figure
had fallen to 13.5 per cent. The future consequences
are potentially serious both for the mineral-importing
countries of the EEC and for many of the mineral-
exporting countries of the ACP. When Europe
recovers from recession, the EEC countries may find
themselves experiencing severe shortages of certain
minerals and, in any event, will have to pay higher
prices for their imports than would have been
necessary had the most economic sources of supply
been developed. The ACP group of countries, so the
argument goes, would suffer through a failure to
realise the mining investment, production, and foreign
exchange earnings that their natural resource
endowment in other circumstances would have made
possible. The proposals for dealing with this situation
have largely centred around international schemes to
provide political risk insurance for the investing
companies on the one hand and, on the other, the
threat of severe sanctions to be imposed against any
host country government which is judged to have
altered unilaterally the terms under which mining
L)
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N
Zambia - the open pit at Chambishi. Below: left - the converter aísle in the smelter at Mufulira: right - aspect of an underground
operation.
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investment had earlier taken place [European Mining
Companies 1976].
More recently, both the factual description of what
has been happening to the level and pattern of
exploration activity in the Third World, and the
accuracy of the diagnosis upon which the prescription
of insurance-type cures was based, have been
questioned. In particular, it has been argued a) that the
decline in Third World exploration activity is not
general; b) that what has been happening has been a
basic shift in the type of institution financing or
undertaking such investment; and c) that where
declines have occurred, this has been as much the
consequence of weak market conditions as of a general
apprehension of political risk.
The most detailed analysis of the problem has been
conducted by Radetzki [1982]. His conclusions are
that the share of global direct foreign investments in
the mineral sector allocated to developing countries
(mainly from the USA and the EEC countries) was
substantially curtailed some time before 1966, but that
it then remained relatively constant until the present.
Moreover, there is a contrast between the declining
role of developing countries as hosts to foreign direct
investment in mining and their continued importance
in terms of production and overall investment in
minerals. Two factors have accounted for this
apparent paradox. The first has been the increasing
role of national enterprise in developing country
minerals. The second and more important factor has
been the large-scale substitution of loans for equity in
financing mineral projects in developing countries.
Even if Radetzki's explanation is accepted, however,
three further possibilities remain and have at different
times been urged. First, that even though developing
countries have maintained their share of overall
investment and production, their share of exploration
expenditure has been decreasing and this, after an 8-10
year time lag, will eventually affect production.
Second, that even where the quantity of exploration
expenditure has been maintained, its quality has fallen
off. And third, that whatever the global figures may
show, certain specific ACP countries are not attracting
(or managing to finance themselves) the amount of
exploration that their potential mineral resources
would appear to deserve.
It is these hypotheses that have given rise to the
argument that a supplementary and new form of
scheme may be required for dealing with the problem.
In particular, it has been argued that, since future
consumers of mineral products are the most certain
beneficiaries of any expanded or more economic
source of supply, it is they who should bear the
relatively very small burden of financing the earlier
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phases in the mineral exploration effort. Or, put
another way, the cost of discovering new sources of
exhaustible mineral supplies would become a normal
element in the cost of those products which are using
up existing sources of supply. It has been pointed out
also that, whereas a single potential customer funding
exploration for the mineral in which he is interested
cannot be certain of recovering for himself the value of
his outlay in terms of increased security of supply or
lower prices, the wider the community of potential
customers who undertake such funding the more
certain are they collectively to reap the benefit. This
makes such schemes, in concept, singularly appropriate
for Community initiatives.
Purchases
An EEC scheme for emergency purchases of minerals
from selected ACP countries at times of exceptionally
depressed prices would not be a buffer stock scheme. It
would be a scheme to provide support to selected
mineral producers in times of distress which would at
the same time provide a stockpile of selected minerals
that would be held by the Community and could only
be released in times of shortage or, which would
probably be at the same time, when prices were
exceptionally high. To that extent, the scheme might
have an effect, marginally, of stabilising prices
although that would not be its main purpose.
Purchases would be restricted to those minerals
exported by ACP countries in respect of which the
EEC, as a whole, was a major net importer. The scale
of any purchases less disposals of any one mineral
would be limited, apart from budgetary considerations,
to a certain proportion of the Community's net annual
imports of that mineral. Purchases would be funded
not by loan finance but out of an enlarged EDF or
possibly from a special fund into which the proceeds of
sales would also be paid. Ifa special fund were to be
created, consideration could be given to paying for
stock purchases by means of credits that could only be
used for purchasing exports from EEC industries with
unused capacity thus generating, it might be assumed,
increased production within both groups of countries.
The possible advantages of the scheme would be that,
in times of depressed mineral prices, productive
activity would be maintained at a higher level than
might otherwise be possible in the mineral exporting
country, with some expectation that second-stage
demand for the exports of EEC countries would also
be increased. Commensurately, the EEC would
acquire a moderate-sized strategic stockpile of certain
important minerals that it might run short of in times
of improved demand or, possibly, interrupted supply.
The scheme might be expected to have a beneficial
effect in stabilising the export earnings of certain
developing countries. Started at a time when most
mineral prices in real terms are below historical trend
prices, the net cost of the scheme over time might be
expected to be low. Nor is the implementation of such
a scheme as unlikely as it might have appeared earlier.
Though stockpiles are not yet held at Community
level, several member states maintain stockpiles of
strategic minerals and even the British Government
was reported to have started stockpiling in February
1983 [Financial Times, 14 February].
The potential difficulties and disadvantages of such a
scheme, however, cannot be ignored. National policies
within the EEC towards the holding of strategic stocks
differ widely. Purchases that might prevent production
cutbacks could delay price recovery, even if the stocks
were held off the market. And, in terms of
development aid, both EEC and ACP countries would
have to be convinced that funds tied up in
stockholding, even if they might eventually result in a
profit, could not be put to better developmental use.
Mineral revenue stabilisation funds
The idea behind the encouragement (or insistance)
upon the use of mineral revenue stabilisation funds
can best be described as one of benign conditionality.
Such funds are established as a domestic measure to
counteract the instability of earnings from mineral
exports which itself arises from the tendency of
mineral prices to fluctuate. The purpose of a mineral
revenue stabilisation fund is thus primarily to provide
insurance against an inability to maintain development
programmes in periods of slump, but it also helps to
regulate domestic demand stimulated by government
expenditure by preventing such demand from building
up in boom periods. The fund thus contributes to
overall fiscal stabilisation and to monetary stability,
usually by sterilising 'excess' inflows in Central Banks
deposits or direct investments in foreign assets.
Conversely, the fund is run down by releasing money
into the annual budget at a controlled rate when
mineral revenues are low.
It seems unquestionable that such a fund, wisely
operated (like the Mineral Resources Stabilisation
Fund in Papua New Guinea), can have beneficial
effects. Whether the establishment of such funds can
be made a condition of EEC aid in the mineral sector
seems more doubtful, unless the EEC at times of
depressed prices itself provides part of the initial
resources. In current international economic cond-.
itions, very few ldc producers could themselves be in a
position to build up such funds. However, as Philip
Daniel has pointed out,2 this might be an easy time for
an ldc government to put the required machinery in
place, since the budgetary 'cost' of deferring
expenditure would not be incurred until some future
upturn in commodity prices.
2personal communication, 1983.
References
EEC, 1979, The Courier, no 58, Commission of the European
Communities, Brussels, November
EEC-ACP, 1981, The Second A CF-EEC Convention, ACP-
EEC Council of Ministers, Brussels
EIU, 1982, Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda,
Burundi, 2nd Quarter, London
European Mining Companies, 1976, Raw Materials and
Politica/Risk, submission to the President of the European
Communities by a group of European mining companies,
June
Financial Times, 1983, London, 14 February
Fortin, C., 198 1,'The mining sector', Technical Paper no 16
in Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure, findings and
recommendations of the ILO/JASPA basic needs mission
to Zambia, vol II, Addis Ababa
Goldstein, M., 1982, 'The role of the EEC in ACP states'
mineral development' in Legal and Institutional Arrange-
ments in Minerals Development, Mining Journal Books,
London
Radetzki, M., 1982, 'Has political risk scared mineral invest-
ment away from the deposits in developing countries?',
World Development, vol 10 no 1
49
